

















































The costs of wars have been the main driver of public debt in the Western World during the 
modern era. The late twentieth century stands out as a period that saw a pronounced increase of 
government debt to GDP ratios in peacetime. This paper assesses the role that financial crises 
have played in shaping the public debt trajectory in the twentieth century. Focusing on the 
experiences of 14 industrial economies, I show that financial crises have long and lasting effects 
on public finances. I provide evidence that the costs of financial crises have increased strongly 
in the second half of the twentieth century and that the costs of financial crises grow with the 
size of the financial sector. In many countries, the rising costs incurred from stabilizing the 
economy after financial crises were an important cause of the peacetime surge of public debt 
ratios in the late twentieth century. In today's highly financialized economies, financial crises 





Katharina Gärtner provided excellent research assistance as did Christian Lüdde and Felix Mihram who helped 
with data collection. This work was supported by a grant of the National Academy of Sciences in the context of 
the interdisciplinary "Working Group on Public Debt" of which the author is a member. I wish to thank, without 
implicating, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, Irwin Collier, Niall Ferguson, and Alan Taylor for many helpful 
discussions of this topic. Part of this research was undertaken while the author was a Visiting Professor at the 
Economics Department of New York University, Stern School of Business. The support of NYU-Stern is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
	 2
At the time of this paper’s writing, the global financial crisis that began with the collapse of 
the US housing market in 2007 had morphed into a serious political and economic crisis in 
Europe threatening the survival of the common European currency. It is difficult to imagine a 
clearer illustration of the severe political consequences that financial crises can have. The 
2008 crisis emanated from a private sector credit boom and housing bubble in the USA, but 
turned into a sovereign debt crisis in Europe when bail-outs and ballooning budget deficits led 
to a sharp increase of public debt levels. Financial markets started to question the 
sustainability of public debt levels in countries that were affected most strongly from the fall-
out of the previous (private sector) credit boom (Ireland and Spain) as well as those countries 
where the sustainability of already high levels of public debt to GDP became questionable 
when the economic outlook deteriorated (Italy, Portugal, Greece). When markets started to 
worry about debt sustainability, interest rates rose sharply and public debt dynamics 
deteriorated further.  
The past four years clearly illustrate that crises can take a large toll on public sector 
balance sheets and have tremendous political repercussions. The fiscal fall-out from the 
global financial crisis of 2007/08 will shape the political agenda in Europe for years to come. 
In their prescient book from 2009, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff described the 
historical regularity with which private sector financial crises tend to be followed by 
sovereign debt crisis in emerging markets.1 
In this paper, I examine the impact that financial crises had on public debt over the 
past 140 years. Unlike much of the previous literature, this paper focuses on the experience of 
14 industrial countries over the long run. I do not look at emerging market economies and my 
aim is to leave the narrow focus on the post-1960 decades, dominant in the economic 
literature, to study how the interaction of financial crises and government stabilization 
policies evolved over the long run. Moreover, I combine trends in public debt with detailed 
annual data on the growth of the financial sector, which have become available recently.2 This 
allows me to ask if and how the costs of financial crises vary with the size of the financial 
sector.  
The main findings of this paper include the following. First, I demonstrate that the 
budgetary costs of financial crises are large and have increased strongly in the course of the 
past 140 years. In the post-WWII era, public debt to GDP ratios typically rose by one third or 
about 20 percentage points of GDP in the five years after a systemic financial crisis. By 
contrast, prior to WWII, public debt ratios were by and large unaffected by financial crises.  
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Second, I present evidence suggesting that the fiscal costs of financial crises have 
grown as financial sectors have become larger. In economies with large financial sectors, the 
cumulative increase of public debt to GDP following a banking crisis reaches 50% on 
average. This figure does not yet include the experience of the 2008 global financial crisis 
whose fiscal costs could be even higher – for instance, according to forecasts of the 
International Monetary Fund, both the US and the UK will see their debt to GDP ratios 
double as a result of the crisis.3  
Third, I argue that these findings add an important new element to conventional 
narratives of public debt dynamics in the twentieth century. While historically public debt 
dynamics in the Western world have reflected the costs of fighting major wars, the debt build-
up in the second half of the twentieth century stands out as the first marked increase of public 
sector debt ratios in peacetime.4 The rising fiscal costs of financial crises have played an 
important role in this development. In many countries, major financial crises were key factors 
behind the worsening of public debt trajectories. In this respect, the rise in the level of public 
debt in the last decades of the twentieth century is not solely a reflection of generous welfare 
programs or costly economic policies by spendthrift governments. The spectacular growth of 
the financial sector and the increasingly large fiscal costs of financial crises played an 
important, and in some cases a dominant role. The link between the size of the financial sector 
and the fiscal fall-out from crises should be taken into account in the current debate about the 
causes of high public debt and the regulation of the financial sector.  
From both an economic and political point of view, one can question the wisdom of 
government activism in the wake of financial crises. Especially the economic effects of 
stimulus programs remain hotly debated amongst economists. Yet from a historical point of 
view, it is clear that governments have typically decided that increasing fiscal deficits in order 
to mitigate the economic effects of financial crises is a political necessity. The 2008 crisis was 
another landmark event in this long trajectory. Alessandri and Haldane argue that the scale of 
intervention to support the banks has exceeded any previous levels of state assistance.5 
Counting all liquidity and capital injections, debt guarantees as well as deposit insurance and 
asset purchases, they calculate that the total size of interventions in the Eurozone, the United 
Kingdom and the USA amounted to about $14 trillion or a quarter of global GDP – an 
unprecedented mobilization of the public sector balance sheet to deal with the consequences 
of a financial crisis. In addition to these direct guarantees and capital injections – which 
should not be confused with actual losses for the taxpayer that are likely to be much smaller – 
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come the economic and fiscal costs of the crisis: large and persistent budget deficits, 
burgeoning public debt ratios and large output losses.  
But why have the fiscal costs of financial crises increased so strongly in the twentieth 
century? In the last section of this paper, I take a closer look at the revenue and expenditure 
dynamics around financial crises. I find evidence that financial crises take a heavier toll on 
public revenues when the size of the financial sector is large. Crises in more highly 
financialized economies tend to have more severe effects on the revenue base and therefore 
go hand in hand with much costlier post-crisis stabilization efforts. These results mesh with 
previous research that has shown that the economic effects of crises tend to be a function of 
the previous credit expansion and the level of financialization.6  
From a historical perspective, the main findings of this study can be rationalized by 
the fundamental shift in relations between the state and the financial sector that has taken 
place in the course of the twentieth century. The birth of active government stabilization 
policies to fight financial crises dates back to the Great Depression.7 The Depression was a 
watershed event for macroeconomic thinking and policymaking. The 1930s showed that the 
costs of doing nothing in the face of systemic banking sector instability were unbearably high 
– both in economic and political terms. As a consequence, most countries introduced publicly 
guaranteed deposit insurance schemes and established other tools to prevent the financial 
sector from collapsing in times of stress.  
Through these policies the state assumed a new role – that of guaranteeing the 
integrity of the financial system. Financial stability became a quasi-public good and the 
liabilities of the banking sector became implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the government. 
In times of crises, the public sector balance sheet could be mobilized to temper the 
consequences of financial instability and support the real economy through deficit spending. 
Yet as Alessandri and Haldane argue, there was also another side of this implicit depression 
era "social contract" between the state and the financial sector: tight financial regulation.8 The 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in the USA is the best example illustrating this two-sided 
arrangement. In exchange for public backstops for the financial sector in the form of deposit 
insurance through the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the act established a set of 
financial regulations including the separation of commercial and investment banking that 
became characteristic of the US banking system until the separation was dismantled again in 
the 1990s. The economic logic behind stricter regulation was clear. As the state became the 
ultimate guarantor of the liabilities of the financial sector, the government had to be able to 
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control the accumulation of risks in the financial sector. In other words, regulation was the 
quid pro quo of deposit insurance and other public sector guarantees for the financial sector.  
However, as the memory of the Depression faded, this tight regulatory regime was 
incrementally dissolved. Financial deregulation and liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s 
freed the financial sector from many earlier limits with regard to its size and capacity for 
financial risk taking. Yet while one side of the Depression era "contract" between 
governments and the financial sector dissolved, the other side did not. Finance was 
increasingly free from regulatory constraints, but the public sector remained the guarantor of 
last resort in times of crisis. The contract became one-sided and a large chasm opened up: 
governments remained responsible for an ever-larger financial sector whose behavior was 
more and more withdrawn from public oversight. 
It is even possible if not likely that implicit government guarantees might themselves 
have been a key cause of the extraordinary growth of the financial sector in the second half of 
the twentieth century. It is possible that the financial sector grew so large after the 1970s 
partly because of implicit and explicit government backstops that provided a safety cushion 
for banks. As rational economic actors, financial institutions have anticipated the government 
response to financial crises, increased their risk taking and lowered capital buffers. The 
financial sector has begun to "bank on the state."9 In a similar vein, I have demonstrated 
elsewhere with Alan Taylor that central bank's reaction function to financial crises has 
changed dramatically after WWII.10 Through policy interventions, central banks in the post-
WWII period have prevented a contraction of the money supply, deflation and rapid financial 
deleveraging. But the very success of central banks in moderating the fall-out from financial 
crises might have encouraged risk-taking on an ever-greater scale.  
These questions are not easily disentangled and not all questions can be answered with 
the data at hand. The main purpose of this paper is therefore to provide an empirical backbone 
for the ongoing debate. My aim is to present a few key stylized facts about the 
macroeconomic history of financial crises. I will concentrate on the question of how large the 
costs of crises have been at different times and under different policy regimes – from the gold 
standard until today – and pay particular attention to the question of how the costs of financial 
crises relate to the size of the financial sector.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. I first sketch out the debate about the costs of 
financial crises. In the second section, I briefly discuss the data sources and the key concepts 
and definitions I work with. The third part of the paper is devoted to a discussion of long-run 
trends in public debt in the Western world from the late nineteenth century until today. The 
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fourth part then considers the interaction of financial crises and public debt. The fifth part 
looks in greater detail at the effects of crises on government revenues and expenditures. The 
final section offers some concluding remarks.  
 
1. The costs of financial crises 
That financial crises have substantial costs for the real economy is now widely acknowledged. 
Recent studies by Cerra and Saxena, Reinhart and Rogoff, as well as Reinhart and Reinhart 
and Jorda, Schularick and Taylor have provided ample evidence supporting the idea that 
financial crises have long-lasting negative effects on output.11 Cerra and Saxena find that 
financial crises lead to output losses in the range of 7.5% of GDP over ten years. Reinhart and 
Rogoff calculate that the historical average of peak-to-trough output drops following banking 
crises is about 9%. Teulings and Zubanov also estimate an output loss of 10%.12 In addition, 
Kroszner, Laeven and Klingbiel argue that crises in larger financial systems are associated 
with stronger macroeconomic effects.13 Using long-run historical data, Jorda, Schularick and 
Taylor basically confirm the plausibility of these estimates.14 While the presence of long-
lasting negative output effects of financial crises seems well established (and seems born out 
by the sluggishness of the current recovery), the wider public as well as financial markets 
have become more and more concerned with a different fall-out from financial crises: the 
fiscal costs of crises.  
The notion that financial crises tend to be associated with a significant deterioration of 
government balance sheets is not new.15 The combination of weaker economic growth and 
lower revenues as well as an increase in government expenditures linked to direct bailout 
costs and stimulus programs widens deficits and thereby increases the existing government 
debt.16 Reinhart and Rogoff argue that a strong link exists between banking crises, the 
subsequent increase in public debt and sovereign defaults.17 Focusing on the major post-
World War II episodes, they assert that even absent large costs associated with bailing out and 
recapitalizing the banking system, government debts rise about 86 percent relative to pre-
crisis levels in the three years following a systemic banking crisis. In their analysis, the main 
driver of the increase in public debt is the collapse in tax revenues arising from deep and 
prolonged output contractions. In addition, rising interest rates on government debt as well as 
fiscal stimulus programs contribute to the post-crisis debt surge.18 However, as their sample 
contains many emerging market crises, it is not clear to what extent the findings are also 
applicable for the OECD countries.  
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In related work, Furceri assumes a wider perspective and analyzes a sample of 28 
OECD economies over the period 1970 to 2008.19 He finds that financial crises on average 
lead to a permanent increase in the government debt to GDP ratio of 6 percentage points (ten 
years after the financial crisis). The occurrence of a “severe crisis” resulted in an increase of 
32 percentage points in the debt to GDP ratio. Furceri and Zdienicka widened this analysis to 
a sample of 154 countries in the period 1970 to 2006.20 Their study confirms that banking 
crises are associated with a substantial and enduring increase in the public debt to GDP ratio. 
For severe crises, they find an increase of up to 50 percentage points at the peak and by about 
37 percentage points over the medium term – that is eight years after the crisis started. 
Moreover, they find that the magnitude of this effect also depends on various initial 
conditions such as the debt to GDP ratio as well as the size of foreign debt shares that a 
country holds. 
Finally, as part of major research undertaken at the International Monetary Fund, 
Abbas et al. collected data on gross government debt-to-GDP ratios covering 174 countries 
starting in 1880.21 Abbas et al. show that the negative impact of the 2008 crisis on public debt 
has been much worse than in the Great Depression, albeit the output costs have been smaller – 
potentially because of larger government interventions. In the current crisis, governments 
have applied the lessons of the Great Depression and assumed more active roles in the face of 
financial disruptions. 
A related body of literature is concerned with the economic effects of high public debt 
levels. It was again the influential work of Reinhart and Rogoff that stimulated the debate.22 
The key question is whether high public debt levels might affect economic growth negatively 
through higher interest rates or lower private sector confidence. Reinhart and Rogoff find that 
economic growth is negatively affected once public debt to GDP levels cross the 90% level – 
this figure has been quoted often in the media. Checherita and Rother as well as Kumar and 
Woo have also found evidence of slower growth when public debts are high.23 Leaving the 
difficult issues of reverse causality aside – low growth could be the reason for high public 
debt – there continues to be disagreement about the validity of the original numbers presented 
by Reinhart and Rogoff.  
On closer inspection, it turns out that their findings depend upon the inclusion of the 
immediate post-WWII years. During 1946 and 1947, the US and other economies saw deep 
recessions because of transition from the war to a peacetime economy. During this transition 
public debts were high because of the budgetary costs of the war effort. But it is questionable 
whether these special episodes should be used to construct a causal argument about the impact 
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of high public debts on economic growth. As figure 1 demonstrates, there is hardly any 
difference in average growth rates at high or low levels of public debt if the postwar 
recessions are omitted.24 The figure shows average rates of growth at different levels of public 
debt over GDP since 1880. Excluding the immediate war and postwar years (1914-1920; 
1939-1947), no relationship between public debt levels and growth is visible.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1. Public debt and growth, 1880-2008 
 
 
2. Data and definitions 
For a more detailed investigation of the relationship between financial crises and public debt, 
some terms and definitions need to be clarified upfront. The first important definitional issue 
concerns financial crises per se. There is no simple definition of financial crises. Moreover, 
the timing of historical crises can be controversial. In line with previous studies, I define a 
financial crises as an event during which a country’s financial sector experiences a bank run 
or a sharp increase in default rates accompanied by large losses of capital. These 
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Public	Debt	Ratios	and	Growth,	1880‐2008	
Note: average for 14 advanced countries: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States.
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On the basis of this definition, I have presented a consensus timing of financial crises 
in the past 140 years for a sample of 14 countries in a joint paper with Jorda and Taylor.26 We 
studied the following countries: United States, Canada, Australia, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. Compiling this list, we received help from a large number of other financial 
historians around the world. Each individual crisis date for the pre-1940 era was double-
checked by country experts. For the post 1960-period, banking crises histories are based on 
the database compiled by Laeven and Valencia. According to this definition, between 1870 
and 2010, 79 systemic financial crises occurred in the 14 industries countries studied here. 
Table 1 summarizes this definition of crises events by country-year. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
Looking at the incidence of financial crises in the past 140 years, it becomes clear very 
quickly that their frequency has varied substantially. Before the Second World War, financial 
crises were relatively frequent – possibly owing to the absence of a lender of last resort in 
many countries, e.g., in the USA. The immediate post-WWII decades by contrast were a 
financial oasis of calm. Domestic financial regulation was tight and the Bretton-Woods 
System restricted international capital movements. As a matter of fact, no big financial crisis 
occurred in the 30 years between 1945 and 1974. From the mid-1970s on, financial instability 
returned. Financial deregulation and international capital market integration are likely to have 
played a role in this process.27 Figure 2 displays the number of countries (out of the 14 
country sample) that witnessed a systemic financial crisis in any given year since 1870.  
Table 1: Financial Crisis Dates
Australia 1893 1989
Canada 1873 1893 1907 1923 1985
Switzerland 1870 1910 1931 2008
Germany 1873 1891 1901 1907 1931 2008
Denmark 1877 1885 1902 1907 1921 1931 1987
Spain 1883 1890 1913 1920 1924 1931 1978 2008
France 1882 1889 1907 1930 2008
U.K. 1873 1890 1974 1984 1991 2007
Italy 1873 1887 1891 1907 1921 1930 1935 1990 2008
Japan 1882 1900 1904 1907 1913 1927 1992
Netherlands 1893 1907 1921 1934 1939 2008
Norway 1899 1922 1931 1988
Sweden 1878 1907 1922 1931 1991 2008
USA 1873 1884 1893 1907 1929 1984 2007
Source: Jorda, Schularick, Taylor (2011)
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[Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2. Frequency of financial crises, 1870-2010 
 
Also with regard to the public debt data, a number of initial clarifications are 
necessary. The data used here come from the historical public debt database compiled by 
Abbas et al. at the IMF.28 The data are accessible via the Internet and aim to cover the 
consolidated general government, i.e. all levels of governments. I have doubled checked these 
data against traditional historical sources such as Mitchell's Historical Statistics and generally 
found the data to be reliable. Some issues remain with regard to the treatment of local 
government debt and various other liabilities, but these are unlikely to change the picture 
dramatically. Private debts of individual monarchs as well as future liabilities of governments 
such as pension liabilities are not included. The data cover the level of public debt to GDP at 
annual frequency. For most of the countries covered here, the data start around 1870 or 1880 
but some important gaps remain. Taken together with the crisis dates described above, the 
historical public debt database allows for a long-run study of the fiscal impact of financial 
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Note: number of countries in crisis; sample of 14 countries
Frequency of Financial Crises, 1870-2010
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3. Long-run trends in public debt 
I will begin by describing some general trends with regard to the development of public debt 
to GDP trend that are evident in the data. Figure 3 displays the development of public debt to 
GDP ratios (as mean and median) for the 14 countries for which we have a detailed body of 
historical financial data. The first impression is that current levels of government debt in 
advanced economies are high, but not extraordinarily so. Current levels of debt to GDP are 
comparable to those reached in the 1920s, but still considerably below the very high levels of 
debt incurred during WWII. The chart also shows common movements in the public debt to 
GDP ratio across countries since the late nineteenth century. In four periods, public debt ratios 
increased significantly: in the First World War, during the Great Depression, then again in the 
Second World War, and finally in the three decades since the late 1970s.  
The First World War drove up public debt ratios to about 70-80% of GDP.29 During 
the boom of the 1920s, government balance sheets improved slightly, but this trend quickly 
reversed when the Great Depression hit. Public debt to GDP ratios rose, not only because 
deficits increased as revenues slumped, but also because the denominator, GDP, fell sharply 
in many countries. The depression underlines a simple but important point about public debt 
dynamics – both the numerator and the denominator merit attention.  
The military effort for the Second World War led to spiraling public debt levels in 
most countries. At the end of the conflict, both the mean and the median reached around 
100% of GDP for the victorious countries. These high public debt levels were no major 
obstacle to the postwar economic boom. This being said, in the defeated axis powers, internal 
debts were generally wiped out so that these countries started from low levels. For the entire 
14-country group, the postwar era was characterized by a marked reduction of public debt to 
GDP ratios. The pre-World War I levels of about 40-50% of GDP were reached again in the 
1960s.Another upward trend started in the late 1970s and lasted to the 1990s. In the mid-
1990s the interwar levels of public debt to GDP were reached again in the majority of 
countries as debt levels crossed the 60% mark. After a brief stabilization in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the upward trend that was visible since the 1970s accelerated in recent years 
following the global financial crisis and the ensuing recession.30  
Ritschl has argued, this peacetime run-up in public debts has no precedent in modern 
history.31 Virtually all major changes in debt trajectories in the modern era were linked, in one 
way or the other, to the cost of financing major wars. Ritschl notes that this raises the 
possibility that a regime shift has taken place in the late twentieth century with potentially 
problematic implications for debt sustainability. Yet the question remains open as to what the 
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new drivers of public debt increases in the second half of the twentieth century were. Can the 
surge in the debt ratio be traced back to a general slowdown in the growth rate of Western 
economies and the inability of politicians and governments to adjust generous spending 
programs to the new reality? Or have other factors played an important role too? I will argue 
below that the fiscal costs of financial crises are an important aspect of this story. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 3: Public Debt/GDP, 1870-2010. Sample of 14 countries. 
 
4. The fiscal costs of financial crises 
In what follows, I will bring together the datasets on financial crises and public debt discussed 
above. The basic approach will be akin to a classical event study approach. In other words, I 
will analyze how the public debt to GDP ratio typically changes in the years after a financial 
crisis event has occurred. I start by looking at summary statistics before breaking the analysis 
down and looking at the effects of crises on public debt relative to individual country trends. 
The key results remain the same across the various ways to make the data speak: Financial 
crises are costly for the public sector. The costs have risen considerably over the course of the 
twentieth century. Moreover, there is evidence that the costs of financial crises are linked to 
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 Table 2 opens the discussion by showing a broad picture of the average annual 
increase in the public debt to GDP ratio in the five years after a financial crisis. The upper 
panel shows that pooling all countries the average annual increase of the public debt to GDP 
ratio following a financial was about 83 basis points. Multiplying the figure by 6 (the crisis 
year plus the following five years) gives a baseline estimate of about 5 percentage points. In 
other words, over the past 140 years financial crises have on average led to a deterioration of 
the public debt to GDP level by roughly 5 percentage points. However, this summary measure 
hides as much information as it reveals. This is because in the pre-WWII period, financial 
crises had hardly any effect on public debt ratios. Yet after WWII, the deterioration is on 
average 330 basis points per year – or around 20 percentage points five years after the crisis. 
The pronounced effect of financial crises on public debt ratios becomes clearer when 
compared to the remaining years (outside the crisis window). In the post-1975 period, public 
debt ratios increased by about 90 basis points per year on average. After 20 years, public debt 
to GDP will increase by around 18 percentage points, certainly a very significant increase. 
Yet this effect pales in comparison with the speed with which public debt ratios balloon after 
a financial crisis. The average deterioration is about 3.5 percentage points per year in years 0-
5 of a financial crisis episode. Put differently, financial crises have become a major driver of 
public debt trajectories for the affected countries. 
Combining the information on public debt and crisis dates with data for the size of the 
financial sector – measured by the total outstanding amount of credit to the private sector 
relative to GDP – allows us to go one step further and check whether the fiscal costs of crises 
vary with the size of the financial sector. The lower panel of table 2 suggests that it does. The 
increase of public debt in more financialized economies, i.e., those with larger financial 
sectors, is more than twice as high. If private sector to credit to GDP is below the sample 
mean of 70%, public debt to GDP increases by a little more than 2 percentage points post-
1975 in the wake of a financial crisis. If a crisis strikes an economy with a large financial 
sector, the effect grows to nearly 5 percentage points implying a deterioration of the public 
debt to GDP ratio of close to 30 percentage points over the following 5 years. These estimates 
rely on about 40-50 observations per group and about 90 post-WWII yearly observations.  
At first sight, these effects might seem implausibly large. A deterioration of 30 
percentage points of GDP would mean that the public debt to GDP ratio increases from, say, 
50% of GDP to 80% within half a decade on average. Moreover, a 30 percentage point 
increase in the public debt to GDP ratio roughly corresponds to the increase in public debt 
witnessed across the western world since the late 1970s, as discussed above. Whether a 
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country had a financial crisis or not might account for the largest part of the deterioration in 
public levels. Does this sound realistic? On a closer look, this is exactly what the individual 
country experiences tell us. Following the Swedish banking crisis in 1991, the public debt 
ratio went from 55% in 1991 to 83% of GDP in 1997; following the Spanish financial crisis 
of 1978, public debt went from 12% of GDP to 37%; and in the 2007 crisis, the UK had a 
public debt to GDP ratio of 43% in 2007 which will have risen to more than 80% by the end 
of 2011 – four years after the crisis. The conclusion is simple: in the developed world today, 
financial crises are a key health risk for public finances. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table	2:	Financial	Crises	and	Public	Debt	Changes 		 		 		
Percentage	point	change	of	the	debt/GDP	ratio	 		 		 		
		 Post	crisis* N	 Normal	 N	
All	years	 0.83	 362	 0.19	 1149	
Pre‐WW2	 ‐0.04	 267	 1.16	 495	
Post‐WW2	 3.31	 95	 ‐0.43	 705	
Post‐1975	 3.46	 93	 0.88	 378	
Post‐1975	and	small	financial	sector*	 2.27	 52	 		 		





As a next step, I will subject these summary statistics to further statistical tests. Two 
possible factors seem particularly important to include. First, different countries could have 
very different long-run public debt trajectories or show different responses to financial crises 
for political or institutional reasons. In other words, any study of the fiscal effects of financial 
crises has to allow for systematic differences between countries. Second, countries might 
share common trends in the development of their public debt ratios – the simultaneous 
increase after the 1970s comes to mind. Financial crises might coincide with periods of 
marked increases in public debt across countries. Also such common shifts across countries 
need to be controlled for.  
Table 3 shows the change in the public debt to GDP ratio following financial crises, 
accounting for country-specific trends and common time effects. The effects are now 
expressed as cumulative (log-) level changes so that the percentage effects over a 5-year 
period after the crisis can be read directly from the coefficients. The most important point 
here is that table 3 basically confirms the key insights gained earlier. Looking at the entire 
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period from 1870 to 2010, public debt ratios increased by about 13% in the years following 
financial crises with high statistical significance. Yet the same dichotomy that we have 
encountered earlier is again visible. Before WWII, the increase is very small (3%) and 
statistically not significant. The real story is that after WWII, financial crises have typically 
triggered a massive deterioration in public debt ratios of more than 30%. As we had seen 
before, the effects are particularly pronounced when crises occur in large financial sectors. In 
post-1975 financial crises, public debt levels jump by nearly 50% relative to a country's trend 
when the financial sector is large relative to the real economy. Needless to add, these effects 
easily pass standard statistical significance test at 99% significance levels.  
 





		 Coefficient	 Standard	error	 t‐value	
All	years	 0.13***	 0.04	 3.08	
Pre‐WW2	 0.03	 0.06	 0.53	
Post‐WW2	 0.31***	 0.07	 4.15	
Post‐1975	 0.32***	 0.07	 4.61	




Where do these results leave us? First, the fiscal costs of financial crises have clearly 
increased over time, however measured. Before WWII, fiscal policy was by and large 
irresponsive to financial crises and their real economic effects. After WWII, governments 
have routinely expanded fiscal deficits to deal with the consequences of financial crises. The 
resulting increase of public debt ratios was considerably larger than before. Second, the costs 
of these interventions appear to vary with the size of the financial sector. Financial crises are 
costlier in more highly financialized economies. Third, in the light of these results financial 
crises have played an important role in the rapid peacetime increase of public debt in the late 
twentieth century. For the ten countries (out of the 14 in the sample) that witnessed financial 
crises in the last 40 years, the average effect was to drive up public debt to GDP ratios by a 
cumulative 30-50%, depending on the size of the financial sector. These effects are not only 
statistically significant but also economically large and account for a dominant part of the 
post-1970 debt increase.  
For most of modern history, wars were the most significant drivers of public debt 
dynamics in the western world.32 By contrast, financial crises generally did not leave a big 
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imprint on trends in public debt until the second half of the twentieth century. Yet, during the 
last quarter of the twentieth century financial crises have shaped public debt trajectories in a 
major way and arguably more so than other developments. As the figures in table 2 
demonstrate, the increase of public debt ratios outside the financial crisis episodes was much 
more subdued. For the 14 country sample studied here, public debt to GDP ratios rose by less 
than 90 basis points per year in "normal" times, compared to close to 350 basis points after 
financial crises. Any history of public debt that does not account for the important role of 
financial crises in affecting public debt trajectories in the late twentieth century would be 
highly incomplete.  
 
5. Effects of crises on public revenues and expenditures 
Why have the costs of financial crises increased so strongly during the second half of the 
twentieth century? It is likely that two different dynamics were at work. On the one hand, 
governments have generally taken a much more active role in managing the business cycle in 
the second half of the twentieth century. As is well known, macroeconomic policies that steer 
aggregate demand not only through monetary policy, but also through deficit spending have 
grown in importance. As financial crises often go hand in hand with recessions, the larger 
fiscal costs of financial crises in the post-1945 world to some degree reflect the fiscal costs of 
fighting the ensuing recessions. Second, in the second half of the twentieth century the 
financial sector has grown strongly relative to the real economy. For a given level of 
government intervention in the economy, crises appear to be costlier if the financial sector is 
large. Crises in more highly financialized economies seem to take a heavier toll on the real 
economy and lead to larger fiscal deficits in the years following the crisis. 
Figure 4 illustrate the extraordinary growth of the financial sector relative to the real 
economy in the 14 countries studied here.33 Faced with this historically unprecedented growth 
of financial intermediaries, it comes as little surprise that the frequency of financial crises has 
increased again. Liberalization and deregulation make banking freer but potentially more 
vulnerable to crisis.34 More highly financialized economies seem to run a greater risk of 
incurring financial crisis.35 Just as more leveraged companies run a higher risk of bankruptcy 
when the business cycle turns, more leveraged financial systems are more vulnerable to 
financial or real shocks. But a higher probability of incurring a financial crisis is not the only 
worry for the government when the financial sector is large – also the fiscal costs of crises 
seem to grow when they happen.  
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[Figure 4 here] 
 
Figure 4. Size of the financial sector, 1870-2010. 
 
We can say a little more about the reasons behind the increasing fiscal costs of crises 
in highly financialized economies by studying how crises affect revenues and expenditure. In 
table 4, I repeat the earlier exercise and look at the cumulative change of revenue and 
expenditure (in real terms over the five years following a crisis) relative to long run, country-
specific trends. Put differently, I ask how a financial crisis "changes" the long run patterns in 
the growth rate of real government revenues and expenditures. In a second step, I repeat the 
same analysis but look at the effects of high and low levels of financialization. As it turns out, 
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Note: Sample of 14 Countries. Source: See text.
Total bank assets, % of GDP






Real	government	revenue	 Coefficient	 Standard	error	 t‐value	
All	years	 ‐0.13***	 0.03	 ‐3.96	
Pre‐WW2	 ‐0.09*	 0.05	 ‐1.90	
Post‐WW2	 ‐0.09*	 0.05	 ‐1.79	
All	years,	large	financial	sector	 ‐0.18***	 0.05	 ‐3.45	
Pre‐WW2,	large	financial	sector	 ‐0.14*	 0.07	 ‐1.81	
Post‐WW2,	large	financial	sector	 ‐0.19*	 0.11	 ‐1.82	
Real	government	expenditure	 		 		 		
All	years	 ‐0.07	 0.05	 ‐1.52	
Pre‐WW2	 ‐0.07	 0.08	 ‐0.86	
Post‐WW2	 0.03	 0.06	 0.50	
All	years,	large	financial	sector	 ‐0.07	 0.08	 ‐0.87	
Pre‐WW2,	large	financial	sector	 ‐0.03	 0.12	 ‐0.26	





The results presented in table 4 paint an interesting picture. The predominant effect of 
financial crises is to depress government revenue. As for government expenditure, the effects 
are much smaller and much less precisely estimated. If anything, it seems that government 
expenditure falls in the five years following a financial crisis, but by an economically and 
statistically insignificant amount. It is hence not the increase in expenditure, but the 
pronounced decline in revenue that makes financial crises so costly for public accounts.36 
More importantly, table 4 also helps us answer the question as to why the public debt 
effects of financial crises tend to be considerably larger when a crisis occurs in a highly 
financialized economy. The reason is that the cumulative shortfall in revenues is about twice 
as high in the post-WWII period (19% vs. 9%) and about 50% higher for the entire sample 
(19% vs. 13%) when the financial sector is large.37 Moreover, this is not simply a pre-WWII 
vs. post-WWII story. The same difference is apparent in pre-WWII and post-WWII data 
separately: in both periods financial crises tend to lead to sharper revenue declines when the 
financial sector is larger. These results mesh with recent findings that that credit booms lead 
to more severe recessions when the financial sector is big.38 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to demonstrate that over the past century financial crises have taken an 
increasingly large toll on public finances. Financial crises have become a major risk for the 
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sustainability of public finances. In today's large financial systems, a financial crisis will 
typically lead to a 50% deterioration of the public debt to GDP ratio from the initial level. To 
make things concrete, the pre-crisis sample average of public debt to GDP was a little above 
60% of GDP. The results obtained here imply that the financial crisis can be expected to 
increase this ratio to between 80% and 90% of GDP, depending on the size of the financial 
sector. It may well turn out that these estimates, relying on past data for smaller financial 
sectors, prove too optimistic. 
In any case, it is clear that the potential fiscal fall-out from financial crises represents a 
major contingent liability of the public sector. Clearly, the validity of these estimates depends 
on the assumption that financial crises can be treated as "exogenous" shocks, unrelated to the 
fundamentals of the economy. In the real world, very few things are truly exogenous and the 
relationships much more intertwined and complex: crises don't just happen; they build up over 
many years. In this sense, it is clearly possible that underlying trends account both for the 
occurrence of a financial crises and for the subsequent effects on the real economy and fiscal 
accounts.  
However, there seems to be at least relatively strong prima facie evidence for a close 
link between financial liberalization, the frequency and severity of crises and the massive 
deterioration of government balance sheets. From a policy perspective, these connections 
appear too strong to ignore and should be taken into account when it comes to the regulation 
of the financial sector and a comprehensive assessment of the risks and benefits of the growth 
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